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Audience Measurement, the Diversity Principle,
and the First Amendment Right to Construct the Audience
Philip M. Napoli, Fordham University
During the months leading up to the historic election of Barack Obama as the 44th
President of the United States, a tremendous amount of attention was being paid to the issue of
race, to the role of the media in the depiction of race, and to various other points of intersection
between race, the media, and politics. 1 During these same months, another issue with
tremendous implications for the interaction between race and the media was developing; in light
of the historic presidential campaign that was reaching its climax, it is perhaps not surprising that
this issue received relatively little attention. This issue involved the introduction by radio
audience measurement firm Arbitron of a new system for measuring radio audiences in 14 of the
largest radio markets in the United States. 2 Dubbed the Portable People Meter (PPM), this new
system of audience measurement replaced the paper diaries that radio listeners traditionally have
used to record their radio listening with a small, pager-sized device that automatically captures
the audio signals to which the carrier of the device is exposed, and translates that information
into the ratings data that are fundamental to the buying and selling of radio audiences. 3

1

See Bonnie Erbe, Race, Racism, and the Media in the John McCain—Barack Obama Presidential Election. U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/blogs/erbe/2008/10/27/race-racism-and-the-mediain-the-john-mccain-barack-obama-election.html (focusing on a roundtable discussion and the fair portrayal of race at
this particular discussion of race in the 2008 elections); Julie Novkov, Rethinking Race in American Politics, 61
POL. RES. Q. 649, 649-50 (Dec. 2008) (analyzing the historical relationship between race and politics in the United
States in light of Obama’s presidential campaign).
2
See Louisa Ada Seltzer, Arbitron Plays Tough: Rolls Out PPM, MEDIA LIFE MAG. (Oct. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/artman2/publish/Radio_46/Arbitron_plays_tough_Rolls_out_PPM.asp
(explaining the new tracking system for radio listening requires sample participants to enter their listening choices
into a device they wear, and the device emits electronic signals to the Portable People Meter).
3
See Sarah McBride, New Way to Count Listeners Shakes Up Radio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2007, at B1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB118903798218018792.html (noting that the PPM results have caused some
radio stations to cut rates or request higher rates for advertisements).
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The introduction of the PPM in these markets proved so controversial that it led to
lawsuits seeking to prevent the launch of the system by the Attorneys General of New York 4 and
New Jersey, 5 to an inquiry into the PPM being opened by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), 6 and to statements of protest against the PPM system from the New York
City Council. 7 Other protests came from members of the U.S. Senate, including then–
presidential candidate Barack Obama, 8 and from a wide range of minority media and public
interest organizations, including the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, the
Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, the NAACP, and the Media Access Project. 9
Why did the introduction of a new radio audience measurement system provoke such a
response? And why were minority groups, in particular, opposed to this new measurement
system? The answer lies in the important role that audience information plays in the functioning
of our media system, and the fact that a new audience measurement system can produce
significantly different portraits of the media audience from the system that preceded it. In the
case of Arbitron’s Portable People Meter, the new methodology resulted in ratings for many
radio stations targeting African-American and Hispanic audiences that were significantly lower
than their ratings under the traditional diary system. 10 Lower ratings tend to lead to lower
advertising revenues, which of course makes survival for any media outlet more difficult. But if
4

Notice of Verified Petition at 1, State v. Arbitron, 2008 WL 4735227 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08 Civ. 8497(DLC)).
Complaint at 1, Milgram v. Arbitron, (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 2008) (No. MID-L-8428-08) [hereinafter
Complaint]. The Attorney General of Maryland later filed a similar lawsuit as well.
6
Public Notice, Media Bureau Action, PPM Coalition Files Petition Seeking Commission Inquiry Pursuant to
Section 403 of the Communications Act of 1934, No. 08-187 (Sept. 4, 2008).
7
New York City, N.Y., Council Resolution No. 1583-A, Committee on Consumer Affairs, (Sept. 24, 2008),
available at http://ww.webdocs/nyccouncil.info/attachments/851131.htm.
8
See Letter from Daniel K. Inouye & Patrick J. Leahy to Stephen B. Morris, Chairman, President, CEO, Arbitron
(Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Robert Menendez & Ken Salazar, Senators, to Stephen B. Morris,
Chairman, President, CEO, Arbitron (Oct. 2, 2008) (on file with author); John Eggerton, Obama to Arbitron: Delay
PPM Rollout, BROAD. & CABLE, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/115656Obama_to_Arbitron_Delay_PPM_Rollout.php (Sept. 29, 2008, 18:13 MT).
9
Letter from Benjamin Todd Jealous, President/CEO, NAACP, to Kevin Martin, Chairman, FCC (Oct. 3, 2008) (on
file with author).
10
See notes xx infra and accompanying text.
5

4
minority-targeted media outlets are suffering disproportionately under the new measurement
system, then significant diversity concerns arise, as the availability of content serving a wide
range of audience interests and concerns becomes jeopardized. If minority-targeted media
outlets are suffering disproportionately under the new measurement system because of flaws in
the methodology, then we are faced with the question of whether this is a situation requiring
some sort of legal or public policy intervention on behalf of preserving diversity in the media.
However, the question of if or how the government can intervene in such a situation rests
on as-yet unclear determinations regarding the nature of audience ratings. Specifically, what
level of First Amendment protection from government intervention do ratings firms have to
construct the audience? What kind of speech are audience ratings? Are they commercial or noncommercial speech? Do they represent an expression of fact or an expression of opinion? These
are the questions that have been debated in the PPM controversy. How they are answered
ultimately will play a key role in determining whether government intervention into the audience
ratings industry is permissible on behalf of diversity in the media
This article represents an initial effort to wade into these complex questions. It offers
some preliminary thoughts that might guide how the courts and policymakers approach this
ambiguous, complex construct known as the media audience. The first section of this article
provides more detailed background on the Arbitron Portable People Meter and the controversy
that its introduction has created. The second section details the arguments that have been
advanced by the various stakeholders involved in this controversy regarding the appropriate
speech classification for audience ratings, particularly in terms of whether ratings represent an
expression of fact or opinion and whether ratings represent commercial or non-commercial
speech. The third section considers the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments and offers
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some additional perspectives on the speech classification of audience ratings, drawing insights
from both communications and legal scholarship. The concluding section summarizes the
article’s main points and offers suggestions for future research.
I. THE ARBITRON PORTABLE PEOPLE METER AND THE ECONOMICS OF AUDIENCES
In 1992, Arbitron, the nation’s only provider of detailed national and local radio audience
estimates across all U.S. radio markets, began developing an electronic measurement system that
would eventually replace the paper diaries that long have been used to measure radio
audiences. 11 This effort reflected long-standing criticisms of diaries––criticisms that tended to
focus on misrepresentations of radio audiences’ listening behavior that likely arose from the
diary methodology. 12 Critics noted, for instance, that it was unlikely that a diary-keeper would
write down each instance in which she switched to another station, given the frequency of
channel-surfing during radio listening, and the frequency with which radio listening takes place
while driving a car. 13 Paper diaries also raise the possibility of intentional distortion, as they
allow listeners the opportunity to misrepresent their listening behaviors. 14
These and other methodological concerns contributed to the development of the Arbitron
Portable People Meter, a small, pager-like device that the listener carries, and that automatically
records and identifies (via an inaudible audio code) the stations to which the carrier is being

11

See Katy Bachman, Radio: Arbitron Goes Portable, MEDIAWEEK, Oct. 19, 1998 (noting that “Arbitron first touted
the portable meter in 1992 as a technology that would be too expensive for radio only”).
12
See PHILIP M. NAPOLI, AUDIENCE ECONOMICS: MEDIA INSTITUTIONS AND THE MARKETPLACE 73-5 (2003)
[hereinafter AUDIENCE ECONOMICS] (providing an overview of the critiques of the diary method of gathering
audience data).
13
See id. at 78-9 (noting that diaries require “diligence” and that many participants fill out their entire diary, which
records a week’s worth of audio or television consumption, in the evening prior to its due date).
14
See id. at 74 (noting that diaries provide “ample opportunity” for “both recall error and intentional
misrepresentation”).
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exposed. 15 The PPM carrier need only carry the device all day (attached to a belt or a purse, etc.)
and then dock it at night in an Arbitron-provided docking station. All of the relevant listening
data are uploaded, aggregated, and linked with the carrier’s demographic data, so that detailed
radio listening reports can be produced much more quickly than via paper diaries, which need to
be mailed back to Arbitron for tabulation at the end of each week. 16
Arbitron began rolling out its new system via trials in test markets such as Wilmington,
Delaware and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 17 The PPM went “live” in Philadelphia in March 2007
and in Houston in June of that same year. 18 This meant that, as of those dates, the PPM data
officially replaced the diary data as the “currency” to be used in setting the rates for the buying
and selling of radio audiences. The next steps for the PPM roll-out were introductions in eight
additional large markets, including New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco. 19
There is relatively little dispute over whether the PPM technology is superior to the paper
diary. Diaries require more work and recall from participants than the PPM. The PPM is much
closer to the kind of true “passive” audience measurement system that long has been seen as the
holy grail in the world of audience measurement. 20 A passive audience measurement system is
one in which the participant has to do little, if anything, in order for the data to be gathered.

15

See Arbitron, The Portable People Meter, New Age for Radio––Electronic Audience Measurement with the
Portable People Meter System, http://www.arbitron.com/portable_people_meters/ppm_service.htm (last visited
March 24, 2009).
16
See id.
17
See Sarah McBride, New Way to Count Listeners Shakes Up Radio, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2007, at B1 (noting that
PPM has already been tested in Philadelphia).
18
See ARBITRON PPM COMMERCIALIZATION SCHEDULE (Nov. 2008),
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/ppm_rollout.pdf (indicating that PPM was launched in Philadelphia and
Houston in March 2008 and June 2008, respectively).
19
See id. (listing New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas/Fort Worth, Atlanta, Washington and
Detroit as launch sites for PPM in September 2008).
20
See AUDIENCE ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 154. “Historically, measurement firms have explored a variety of
(sometimes outlandish) alternative systems of audience measurement. Typically, these efforts have focused on
developing passive measurement systems that eliminate any need for audience input, thereby minimizing the recall
error that is exacerbated by increased media fragmentation.” (citation omitted) Id.
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This, of course, reduces the likelihood for error. In this case, carrying the meter is much less
burdensome on the participant than carrying and maintaining a listening diary.
Nonetheless, the introduction of the PPM was quickly met with resistance by many
within the radio industry and within the public interest and advocacy communities. Industry
associations such as the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters, the Spanish Radio
Association, and the Association of Hispanic Advertising Agencies asked that Arbitron delay the
roll-out of the PPM service. 21 Public interest and advocacy organizations such as the NAACP
and the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council soon began expressing concerns about
the PPM roll-out as well. 22
This resistance stemmed from the fact that the PPM data indicated that the switch from
paper diaries to PPMs has resulted in significant declines in ratings for many stations that target
minority listeners. While most stations experience ratings declines under the PPM methodology,
“the declines are generally steeper for ethnic stations, some of which have seen declines of 50
percent or more.” 23 This situation has led some policymakers to speculate that the introduction of
the PPM could cause “the greatest loss of asset value by minority broadcasters in history, leading

21

See Press Release, Association of Hispanic Advertising Agencies, Association of Hispanic Advertising Agencies
Rallies Industry Leaders to Tackle Portable People Meter Challenges (May 19, 2008), available at
http://www.ahaa.org/media/PPM%20Advisory%20Council%20Members.htm (emphasizing the serious adverse
effects of PPM implementation on Hispanic advertising); Press Release, PR Newswire, Leading Spanish-Language
Radio Broadcasters Join Forces to Express Concerns About Arbitron’s Flawed Portable People Meter (June 11,
2008), available at http://www.hispanictips.com/2008/06/12/leading-spanish-language-radio-broadcasters-joinforces-to-express-concerns-about-arbitrons-flawed-portable-people-meter-ppm/ (indicating that several major
Spanish-language broadcasters were uniting against PPM implementation); McBride, supra note 17 (“The National
Association of Black Owned Broadcasters is putting pressure on Arbitron to improve the measurement of young
urban listeners.”).
22
Letter from Benjamin Todd Jealous to Kevin Martin, supra note 9, at 1-3 (“The NAACP . . . requests that
Arbitron delay its planned roll-out until the FCC has been able to complete a 403 investigation of this new PPM
methodology. . . .”); Testimony of Joseph S. Miller Before The New York City Council, MINORITY MEDIA &
TELECOMMS. COUNCIL (Sept. 10, 2008), available at http://www.mmtconline.org/filemanager/fileview/173 (“The
implementation of a flawed PPM methodology would be akin to dropping a financial nuclear bomb––what MMTC
estimates to be around $500 million in annual lost revenues––on America’s minority radio stations.”).
23
Kevin Downey, Arbitron: The PPM Rollout Will Proceed, MEDIA LIFE MAG., Oct. 3, 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/artman2/publish/Radio_46/Arbitron_The_PPM_rollout_will_proceed.asp.
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ultimately to the demise of approximately half of these stations.” 24 If minority-owned and
minority-targeted broadcasting were to be so affected, then certainly the long-central
communications policy goal of diversity would take a devastating hit. 25
Arbitron has contested that its new ratings estimates represent such a dire future for
minority-targeted radio stations. 26 Specifically, Arbitron has contended that many minoritytargeted stations that initially experienced ratings declines have subsequently rebounded after
making changes to their programming and promotion practices, and that further, there have been
no systematic declines in the revenues for minority-targeted stations in those markets (Houston
and Philadelphia) where PPM data have served as the currency for over a year. 27 Arbitron also
has contended that there have been no examples of minority-owned or minority-targeted stations
going out of business, or switching away from minority-targeted programming formats, in either
of these markets. 28
Of course, if it were clear that the declines in minority audience sizes were purely a
function of the greater accuracy of the PPM methodology, then this controversy likely would not
have developed in this manner. When a new audience measurement system is introduced, the
24

See Letter from Robert Menendez & Ken Salazar to Stephen B. Morris, supra note 8, at 2. This statement reflects
the fact that minority-owned broadcasters are significantly more likely to provide programming that targets minority
interests and concerns. Id. See generally Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Race and Radio: Preference
Externalities, Minority Ownership, and the Provision of Programming to Minorities, 10 ADVANCES IN APPLIED
MICROECON. 73 (2001) (explaining that smaller markets present problems of sustaining broadcast options for
minority populations).
25
See Philip M. Napoli, Deconstructing the Diversity Principle, 49 J. COMM. 7, 7 (1999) (utilizing the discussion of
diversity as a communications policy goal,); see also Philip M. Napoli, Audience Measurement and Media Policy:
Audience Economics, the Diversity Principle, and the Local People Meter, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 351 (2005)
(referring to a discussion of the diversity issues raised specifically by the process of audience measurement).
26
See Defendant’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 32, Arbitron v. Andrew Cuomo, 2008 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 86573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Defendant’s Proposed Findings] (highlighting
the findings of fact and conclusion to explain the impact of ratings on minority-focused radio channels)
27
See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at
31, Arbitron v. Andrew Cuomo, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 86573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law] (discussing the rating increase after new programming and practices were
implemented at minority targeted radio stations).
28
See id. at 33 (noting that minority targeted or minority owned stations remained in operation without changing
their programming format or targeted audience) on file with author.
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portrait of the media audience produced by the new system virtually always differs significantly
from the portrait of the media audience produced by the old system. 29 To the extent that new
audience measurement systems typically are designed and implemented to improve upon
perceived flaws in the old system, stakeholders typically assume that these discrepancies reflect a
move toward a more accurate representation of the audience. 30
It would be difficult for any stakeholders to argue convincingly against an unassailably
more accurate measurement system, even if that system produced the unfortunate byproduct of
lower audience estimates for minority-targeted stations. Moreover, it is particularly challenging
to determine the extent to which an audience measurement service is accurate, given that there
are no sources of objective data against which to compare the results. That is, illustrations of
dramatic differences between the paper diary data and the PPM data really do not tell us anything
about the accuracy or inaccuracy of the PPM data because the diary data do not represent an
indisputably accurate basis for comparison. 31 It is possible that the diary data were wildly
inaccurate to begin with and that the PPM data provide the more accurate representation of radio
listening. This debate captures the uniquely ambiguous and unstable nature of the “audience
commodity.” 32

29

See AUDIENCE ECONOMICS, supra note 12, at 17–18 (discussing the different data that can result from differing
measurement tools and methodology).
30
See generally, IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 8 (1991) (looking at the discrepant measurement
system as indication of more precise audience measurements).
31
See Erwin Ephron, Recounting Radio: What do the New PPM Numbers Mean, EPHRON ON MEDIA, Oct. 2008,
http://www.ephrononmedia.com/article_archive/articleViewerPublic.asp?articleID=172 (finding that “[s]ince the
two CPMs are based on different measures of audience they cannot be compared”).
32
See, e.g., Dallas Smythe, Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism, 1 CANADIAN J. OF POL. & SOC.
THEORY 1, 5 (1977) (noting the term “audience commodity” is used to reference the notion that audiences are
essentially a product manufactured and sold by ad-supported media industries, emphasizing the role of ratings data
in the commodification of the media audience); Eileen Meehan, Ratings and the Institutional Approach: A Third
Answer to the Commodity Question, 1 CRITICAL STUDIES IN MASS COMM. 216, 216 (1984) (recognizing that the
broadcasting industry focuses its energies on capturing high audience ratings); AUDIENCE ECONOMICS, supra note
12, at 18 (identifying the media audience as a major component within the marketplace and economy).

10
However, critics of the PPM system have asserted that it has a number of specific
methodological shortcomings that they contend are leading to systematic misrepresentation of
minority audiences. These concerns generally do not arise from the PPM technology per se, but
rather from the sampling process via which PPM audience panels are constructed. 33 The
sampling process is another aspect of the production of audience ratings that is vulnerable to
error. Samples that are too small, or that do not accurately reflect the demographic
characteristics of the larger listening population, can provide inaccurate data. 34
Critics of the PPM roll-out contend that the samples that Arbitron constructed are
substandard in ways that lead to significant under-representation of minority radio audiences. A
number of arguments have been put forth in this regard including: that Arbitron’s use of
telephone-based, rather than address-based sampling diminishes the ability to recruit an adequate
Hispanic sample; that the company under-samples cell-phone-only households, thereby underrepresenting minorities and youth; 35 and that response rates and compliance rates for PPM
participants are unacceptably low. 36

33

See, e.g., Kevin Downey, Arbitron Halts Rollout of People Meters, MEDIA LIFE MAG., Nov. 27, 2007, at 1,
available at
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/artman2/publish/Research_25/Arbiton_halts_rollout_of_people_meters.asp
(“But critics say the real issue is that the size of the panel wearing the pager-sized PPMs is simply too small. There
are simply too few people in the sample group to result in data reflecting the listening patterns of the general radio
audience.”); see also Press Release, AHAA PPM and Arbitron Meet in New York to Discuss Industry Concerns
About PPM Implementation (Aug. 21, 2008) (on file with author) (“The Hispanic marketing industry acknowledges
that the transition from diary to electronic audience measurement is the right thing to do. ‘We know that electronic
measurement should yield higher quality data than the diary method; however, historically the sampling
methodology that Arbitron has deployed has been flawed,’ says Isabella Sanchez, AHAA PPM Council
chairwoman.”).
34
See JAMES G. WEBSTER, PATRICIA F. PHALEN, & LAWRENCE W. LICHTY, RATINGS ANALYSIS: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF AUDIENCE RESEARCH 108 (2006) (explaining the benefits of using larger sample sizes).
35
See Verified Petition at 9, State v. Arbitron, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Verified Petition] (explaining that the purpose here is not to make a determination as to the accuracy or inaccuracy
of the PPM system, because that is beyond the article’s focus and requires a privileged access to data and
methodological details).
36
See Letter from Margaret E. Lancaster, Counsel for the PPM Coalition, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC 22-30
(Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/da082048att.pdf (outlining perceived methodological flaws
with the PPM system).
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Of course, one could question the credibility of PPM critics who also happen to be
amongst those most significantly harmed by the new audience estimates. However, in this case,
a presumably neutral third party, the Media Rating Council, also has been critical of the PPM
system. The Media Rating Council is a non-profit organization created by the media and
advertising industries to oversee and accredit audience measurement services. 37 The MRC
engages in detailed assessments of the methodological rigor and soundness of new audience
measurement systems, accrediting those that meet minimum standards of rigor, accuracy, and
reliability. Those services that meet these standards receive a formal accreditation from the
MRC. However, the MRC does not have any binding regulatory authority over the firms that
produce audience data. Measurement firms are not required to subject their methodology to the
MRC accreditation process and, more importantly, if a measurement service is denied
accreditation by the MRC, the measurement firm is in no way required to postpone the launching
of the service until accreditation is received. 38
When Arbitron launched its PPM service in Houston, that service did receive
accreditation from the MRC prior to “going live.” 39 However, the PPM services in Philadelphia
and New York have been denied MRC accreditation to this point. 40 Arbitron has gone live with
these measurement services despite these rebukes from the MRC. 41 Of the 14 U.S. radio markets

37

See Media Rating Council, History and Mission of the MRC, available at
http://www.mediaratingcouncil.org/History/htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009) (listing the crediting and auditing
functions of the MRC).
38
Id. (stating that MRC membership is voluntary and its reports are confidential).
39
See Press Release, Arbitron Receives Media Rating Council Accreditation for the Portable People Meter Radio
Ratings Data in Houston (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.onlinepressroom.net/arbitron (explaining the significance of
achieving MRC accreditation).
40
See Media Rating Council, MRC Statement on Philadelphia and New York PPM 1 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.mediaratingcouncil.org/0208MRC%20PPM%20Statement.pdf (stating that the MRC voted not to grant
accreditation to Philadelphia and New York PPM Services).
41
See Downey, supra note 23, at 1-2 (noting that despite continued resistance, Arbitron plans on launching its
PPM).
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in which PPM data currently are serving as the currency, only the Houston and Riverside PPM
systems have received MRC accreditation.
These concerns about the accuracy of these unaccredited iterations of the PPM service,
and their potential impact on minority-targeted radio, have spilled beyond the confines of the
radio and advertising industries. At the local level, in September of 2008, the New York City
Council issued a resolution calling upon the Federal Communications Commission to open an
investigation into the PPM service. 42 At the state level, in October of 2008, the Attorneys
General of both New York and New Jersey filed lawsuits against Arbitron, seeking damages and
the cessation of the unaccredited PPM services. 43 Additionally, at the federal level, in September
of 2008, the Federal Communications Commission opened an inquiry into the PPM service
aimed at the question of whether a formal FCC investigation into the PPM was appropriate. 44
II. DISCRIMINATION, FRAUD, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT STATUS OF AUDIENCE RATINGS
There are a number of legal claims that have been made against Arbitron and its decision
to issue what many stakeholders consider flawed ratings data. The New Jersey lawsuit alleged
that Arbitron violated the Consumer Fraud Act by: a) replacing an accredited ratings product
with an unaccredited product; b) issuing deceptive and misleading statements regarding its new
service (and the service’s failure to receive accreditation); and c) advertising the product without
designating limitations on its quality. 45 The New Jersey lawsuit also contended that Arbitron

42

See Resolution Calling on the FCC to Investigate Arbitron’s Portable People Meter System and its Potential Effect
on Diversity of Radio, N.Y.C. Res. No.1583-A (Sept. 24, 2008).
43
These lawsuits recently have been settled. Also, Arbitron filed a pre-emptive lawsuit in federal court seeking to
prevent the New York Attorney General from proceeding with the state-level lawsuit. Arbitron’s lawsuit was
dismissed on grounds that did not address the First Amendment status of audience ratings; however, many of the
arguments about the nature of audience ratings provided by both parties within the context of this federal lawsuit
will be discussed here. See Arbitron Inc. v. Cuomo, 2008 WL 4735227, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 27, 2008) (No. 08 Civ.
8497(DLC)).
44
Public Notice, PPM Coalition Files Petition Seeking Commission Inquiry Pursuant to Section 403 of the
Communications Act of 1934, Media Bureau Action, MB Docket No. 08-187 (Sept. 4, 2008).
45
See Complaint, supra note 5, at 3.
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violated the New Jersey Law Against Racial Discrimination by offering a ratings service that
“disparately impacts radio stations serving racial and ethnic minorities.” 46
The New York lawsuit alleged that Arbitron engaged in fraudulent and deceptive
business practices for “repeatedly placing in the marketplace a commercial product that is
unreliable and unrepresentative of the diversity of New York radio markets, while making public
statements that the PPM methodology for New York is reliable and fully representative of the
diversity of New York radio markets.” 47 Also, the New York lawsuit accused Arbitron of false
advertising and of violating New York Civil Rights Law S40-c and Executive Law S296, which
prohibits patterns of conduct that discriminate against persons based on race or national origin.
According to the New York Attorney General:
By imposing the flawed PPM methodology . . . Arbitron has deprived minority
businesses of the equal opportunity to engage in contractual relationships and commercial
activity free from discrimination, in violation of civil rights laws. It has also knowingly
deprived minority communities of the right to diversity of programming and services on
the airwaves. 48
Both lawsuits sought to enjoin Arbitron from issuing PPM data, as well as restitution to those
broadcasters harmed by the PPM service. These lawsuits were settled, with Arbitron continuing
the transition to its PPM system, but agreeing to make some methodological changes to the PPM
sampling process. 49 Given these settlements, the legal arguments about the speech status of
audience ratings that are the focus of this article, were not addressed or resolved by the courts.
It is important to recognize that the nature of the Attorney General’s claims extend not
only to the PPM ratings service, but also to statements Arbitron has made about its ratings
46

See id.
Verified Petition, supra note 35, at 10.
48
Id. at 11.
49
See Anne Milgram v. Arbitron, Final Consent Judgment, Superior Court of New Jersey (January 7, 2009).
Retrieved March 22, 2009, from: http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/pr20090107c-ArbitronConsentJudgment.pdf; New York v. Arbitron, Stipulated Order on Consent, Supreme Court of the State of New
York, County of New York (January 7, 2009). Retrieved March 22, 2009, from:
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/civil_rights/pdfs/Arbitron%20Consent%20Order%2001-07-08.pdf.
47
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service in advertisements, press releases, and on its Web site. This analysis focuses on the
ratings themselves as a form of speech. This focus seems particularly appropriate in light of
Arbitron’s contention that the Attorney General’s ability to enjoin the company from issuing
PPM-based ratings runs aground against the ratings’ status as non-commercial speech.
According to Arbitron, any efforts to enjoin distribution of the PPM data represent a prior
restraint on protected, non-commercial speech, and are thus a violation of the company’s First
Amendment rights. 50
Generally, non-commercial speech receives stronger First Amendment protection than
commercial speech. 51 As the New York Attorney General noted, “False or deceptive commercial
speech is wholly unprotected by the First Amendment.” 52 Non-commercial speech, on the other
hand, is not “subject to prior restraint by the AG under statutes such as New York General
Business Law Sections 349, 350 and 352, nor under Section 40-c of the New York Civil Rights
Law.” 53 From this standpoint, any effort to prevent Arbitron from moving forward with its PPM
roll-out would represent an unlawful infringement on the company’s First Amendment rights.
Arbitron has gone so far as to argue that because the Attorney General’s concerns are directed at
the representations of African-American and Hispanic audiences within Arbitron’s ratings data,
the AG’s efforts “constitute a content-based regulation of speech.” 54
A. The Speech Status of Audience Ratings
50

Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 18 (arguing that any restraint on Arbitron’s publication of its PPM audience
estimates “would constitute an unlawful prior restraint of Arbitron’s right to publish under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments”).
51
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commc’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) (explaining that the
Constitution “accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression”).
52
See Defendant’s Proposed Findings, supra note 26, at 4 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Commc’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
53
Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 18.
54
Plaintiff’s Corrected Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and in Further
Support of its Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 16, Arbitron v. Cuomo, 2008 WL 4735227 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(No. 08 Civ. 8497(DLC)) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Corrected Memorandum].
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Here then, within this context of a dispute over whether government intervention into the
constructions of the audience provided by an audience measurement firm is permissible on
behalf of preserving and promoting diversity in the media, we are confronted with the difficult
question of what kind of speech are audience ratings? The question at the center of this dispute
involves whether ratings are best characterized as commercial or non-commercial speech; but
making such a determination involves addressing underlying questions such as whether audience
ratings represent facts or opinions, and the extent to which audience ratings are a matter of
broader public interest and concern.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never offered a clear and definitive set of criteria
as to what constitutes commercial speech. 55 The unsettled nature of the Supreme Court’s
position on the definition of commercial speech has inspired a wide range of interpretive
approaches, ranging from those that advocate classifying all speech that emerges from a
corporation as commercial 56 to those that advocate abandoning a commercial speech
classification, and the second-tier First Amendment status that accompanies it, in its entirety. 57
The Court has articulated different criteria in different decisions. 58 At the general level,
the Court has defined commercial speech as speech that does no more than propose a
55

See J. Wesley Earnheardt, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky: A Golden Opportunity to Define Commercial Speech – Why
Wouldn’t the Supreme Court Finally “Just Do It”?, 82 N.C.L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2004) (highlighting the fact that
the Court has never fashioned an all-purpose test for defining commercial speech); Karl A. Boedecker, Fred W.
Morgan & Linda Berns Wright, The Evolution of the First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech, 59 J.
MARKETING 38, 42 (1995) (noting that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech has been
criticized and that the problem with the distinction is that the criteria for identifying commercial speech are not
precise).
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See, e.g., Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-Commercial Speech?,
39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 383 (2006) (arguing that “all speech by publicly traded for-profit business corporations is
commercial” and that “No corporate speech is entitled to more than second-tier First Amendment protection
accorded to commercial speech”).
57
See generally Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372 (197980) (explaining that the informative function of commercial speech is protected by the first amendment but that
commercial speech also serves a contractual function which does not directly implicate first amendment interests
and arguing that the regulations aimed at the contractual function of commercial speech should not be tested under
the stricter scrutiny reserved for content related regulation).
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For a detailed overview of the state of commercial speech law, see Boedecker, supra note 54.
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commercial transaction. 59 In some decisions, however, additional characteristics have been
identified, including a) whether the communication is an advertisement; b) whether the
communication refers to a specific product or service; c) whether the speaker has an economic
motivation for the speech; 60 d) whether the speech involves a matter of public rather than private
concern; and e) whether the speech conveys information of interest to audiences beyond
potential customers. 61 Some commercial speech decisions also have suggested that expressions
of opinion are less able to meet the threshold of classification as commercial speech than are
expressions of fact. 62
The fact that the application of these different criteria has varied across different
commercial speech cases helps explain why the arguments put forth by Arbitron and by the New
York and New Jersey Attorneys General seek to address virtually all of them. In support of its
argument that its audience ratings are non-commercial speech, Arbitron first emphasized that its
ratings “do not propose any offer of sale or other commercial transaction by Arbitron to its
subscribers.” 63 Arbitron noted that in a similar lawsuit where Nielsen Media Research was sued
by Spanish-language broadcaster Univision over representations of the Spanish-language
audience provided by Nielsen’s Local People Meter, the court concluded that “[t]hough
advertising sellers and buyers rely on the ratings system, the ratings system itself does not
59

See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining
commercial speech).
60
Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 279 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir.
2008) (noting that “the mere fact that there is an underlying economic motivation in one’s activity does not turn that
activity into commercial speech”).
61
For a useful overview of the tests that have been employed in the analysis of commercial speech, see Boedecker,
supra note 54, at 39.
62
See Kasky v. Nike, 27 Cal. 4th 939, 961 (2002) (“In the context of regulation of false or misleading advertising,
this typically means that the speech consists of representations of fact about the business operations, products, or
services of the speaker . . . This is consistent with, and implicit in, the United States Supreme Court’s commercial
speech decisions”); see also Earnhardt, supra note 54, at 802 (“The court concluded that because Nike was involved
in commerce; because the intended audience was partially made up of potential or past customers of Nike; and
because the statements were factual representations about its business operations and thus commercial in nature, the
statements constituted commercial speech.”) (emphasis added).
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Plaintiff’s Corrected Memorandum, supra note 53, at 20.
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propose a commercial transaction. Therefore, the speech can be afforded full First Amendment
protection.” 64
Arbitron also contended that its ratings did not qualify as commercial speech because the
ratings are “a matter of public interest and concern.” 65 In support of this point, Arbitron noted
how its radio ratings are published in a wide variety of mainstream media outlets and trade
publications. 66 From this standpoint, Arbitron’s construction of the radio audience has a public
relevance that extends well beyond those who subscribe to its ratings service, and this broader
public relevance is indicative of speech with implications that extend beyond narrow commercial
transactions. 67
Arbitron also contended that its ratings represent “its opinions as to the size of radio
audiences and station rankings” (emphasis added). 68 According to Arbitron, “[s]imply because
the final audience measurement estimates are arrived at through statistical analysis and the
results are expressed in numerical form does not make them objective facts, nor does it make
them unworthy of First Amendment protection.” 69
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Univision Commc’n, Inc. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 2004 WL 3050799, at *3 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2004) (No.
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Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 5.
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Arbitron’s emphasis that its ratings data are opinions extends beyond the issue of the
commercial versus non-commercial classification for audience ratings. Other concerns are
involved as well. The first is the well-established principle of copyright law that facts are not
copyrightable. 70 If ratings data were treated as facts in the traditional sense then Arbitron might
not have any enforceable copyright over its ratings, potentially destroying its current business
model. 71 More relevant to this analysis is the extent to which characterizing audience ratings as
opinions makes it more difficult to characterize Arbitron’s PPM ratings as fraudulent commercial
speech, unprotected by the First Amendment, than if the ratings are considered facts. A false
opinion is generally seen as an oxymoron in First Amendment jurisprudence, whereas the
expression of a false fact can much more easily be characterized as fraudulent and has less First
Amendment protection.72
The New York Attorney General 73 contended that Arbitron’s ratings data are a
“statistical service,” sold commercially, and thus regulatable “pursuant to state consumer
protection and civil rights laws without running afoul of the First Amendment.” 74 The Attorney
General argued that the extent to which Arbitron emphasizes the “objectivity” of the PPM
service contradicts the company’s efforts to characterize its ratings as “opinions,” and thus they
are more appropriately classified as facts. 75 The New York Attorney General also countered
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See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (stating “[t]hat there can be no
valid copyright in facts is universally understood”).
71
From this standpoint, should the courts decide that audience ratings are facts rather than opinions, the
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See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing
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Defendant’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 10 (explaining the New York Attorney General’s argument
that Arbitron’s ratings data can be regulated).
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Arbitron’s characterization of its ratings data as information of “public interest and concern” by
noting that Arbitron’s full data do not circulate very widely, as they are fully available only to
“subscribers who purchase the data for a fee.” 76 The New York Attorney General also
contended that the Supreme Court has established that commercial speech is not limited to
advertisements and that commercial speech need not reference a particular product or service.” 77
III. ASSESSING THE SPEECH STATUS OF AUDIENCE RATINGS
It is beyond the scope of this article to assess all of the points of contention that have
arisen about the appropriate speech status of audience ratings, though such a thorough
examination of not only the First Amendment claims, but also the civil rights and fraud claims
that have arisen in this dispute, is much needed. This section will, however, inject some
additional perspectives on the main points of contention, drawing in particular on the distinctive
characteristics of audience ratings and the audience marketplace that have been examined in
significant detail in the communications and media studies literature, and on alternative
analytical approaches to distinguishing fact from opinion and commercial from non-commercial
speech that have been developed within legal scholarship.
A. Fact v. Opinion
We begin with the question of whether audience ratings are best characterized as fact or
opinion. This issue relates not only to the larger issue of whether ratings are appropriately
characterized as commercial or non-commercial speech, but also to the extent that inaccurate
audience ratings can be considered fraudulent. 78 From a legal standpoint, answering this question
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Verified Complaint, supra note 5, at 4-5; Defendant’s Memorandum of Law, supra note 27, at 9 (noting the New
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begins with establishing the appropriate definitions for each of these terms. The Supreme Court
has been reasonably precise in articulating its definition of a fact. Facts, according to the Court,
are not original; they are discovered rather than created. 79 Historical accounts of the meaning of
a fact have emphasized the centrality of numbers – a perspective that strengthens a possible
association between facts and quantitative audience ratings such as those produced by
Arbitron. 80 An opinion, in contrast is best thought of as something that can not be proven right or
wrong. Key defining elements of an opinion that have been used to distinguish opinion from fact
include: a) whether a statement has a precise core of meaning for which a consensus of
understanding exists; b) the verifiability of the statement; c) the broader context or setting in
which a statement appears. 81
The problem is that neither categorization seems ideal for constructions of the media
audience. There is, no doubt a certain amount of cognitive dissonance that emerges from the
contention that ratings data on the one hand represent the opinions of the measurement firm, but
on the other hand serve as what is described by Arbitron as an accurate and objective currency in
the audience marketplace. Arbitron seems to work itself into a bit of a rhetorical corner when the
company first argues in its filing with the U.S. District Court that, due in part to the fact that the
ratings represent the Arbitron’s opinions, they should be classified as non-commercial rather
than commercial speech. 82 Yet in this same document Arbitron argues that, should their ratings
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data be found to be commercial speech, the ratings are “accurate and reliable,” and are therefore
“not false.” 83 The term “accurate” suggests some sort of relationship to factuality; but one
probably cannot go so far as to say that the notion of an “accurate opinion” is inherently
contradictory.
It is, however, also the case that the audience as represented by a ratings firm such as
Arbitron is the outgrowth of a number of subjective decisions and opinions about how best to go
about constructing the audience. Decisions about technology design, sample generation and
recruitment, and data processing all affect the construction of the audience that ultimately serves
as the currency in the audience marketplace. 84 And, as the transition from diaries to PPMs
illustrates, changes in the process lead to very different audiences. It is hard to accept a construct
that is this malleable as a fact.
Indeed, communications scholars have frequently emphasized the extent to which
audience ratings should not be considered as objective facts about the media audience. These
scholars have emphasized the extent to which the audience, as represented in ratings data, is a
socially constructed phenomenon; that it is the outgrowth of a number of highly subjective
interpretations as to what aspect of the audience is of greatest importance, how the relevant
information can best be gathered, and even the extent to which competitive conditions and
market forces impact the processes via which ratings data are produced. 85 The extent to which
the portrait of the media audiences that emerges from a ratings service is affected by these
internal and external forces undermines any notion of audience ratings representing some sort of
Arbitron Reports are original works of opinion that express the views of Arbitron based on its more than 40 years in
the audience measurement field.”).
83
See id. at 24 (explaining that “Arbitron intends to demonstrate that its PPM results are the product of scientific
analysis and opinion and that Arbitron adhered to the highest standards to ensure that its results are accurate and
reliable”).
84
See generally, WEBSTER, PHALEN, & LICHTY, supra note 34.
85
See generally ANG, supra note 30; KAREN BUZZARD, CHAINS OF GOLD (1990); Meehan, supra note 32; AUDIENCE
ECONOMICS, supra note 12.
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objective and verifiable facts about the audience’s media consumption behaviors. From this
standpoint, the media audience, as represented in audience ratings, would seem to be more
appropriately characterized as created rather than discovered.
In making this fact versus opinion determination, perhaps it is also appropriate to
consider how subscribers to the data use the ratings. Research on media organizations and their
use of ratings data suggests that, even if ratings do not clearly meet the threshold associated with
the traditional definition of facts, they nonetheless seem to operate as facts in the functioning of
the marketplace for media audiences. Audience ratings typically are accorded a level of
precision and accuracy attributable only to facts in terms of how they are interpreted and utilized
in the audience marketplace. Media sociologist Todd Gitlin, for instance, in a classic analysis of
the television industry, noted that:
In the tumult of everyday figuring and judging, network executives, even research
specialists, often commit the standard occupational error of unwarranted precision. . . .
Once managers agree to accept a measure, they act as if it is precise. They “know” there
are standard errors––but what a nuisance it would be to act on that knowledge. And so
the number system has an impetus of its own. 86
The key point here is that, to the extent that subscribers treat audience ratings as perfectly
accurate rather than as estimates, they essentially function more as facts than as opinions for
those who utilize them. 87
Clearly then, audience ratings seem frustratingly resistant to categorization as either fact
or opinion. Perhaps it is most appropriate to consider audience ratings as a mix of fact and
opinion. On one level, for instance, the Arbitron PPM data represent basic facts. If the data
uploaded from a PPM indicate three hours of listening for a particular day, spread out across
eight different radio stations, it is a fact that that PPM device was exposed to those particular
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radio signals for those particular periods of time. It is more a matter of opinion when we get to
the issue of whether this aggregation of factual data can be projected to the listening behaviors of
the population as a whole. When Arbitron characterizes its ratings reports as opinions, this is
really a reflection of the extent to which it is the company’s opinion that the data it gathers are
representative of the larger listening population. The dispute over the “accuracy” of the Arbitron
data emerges from differences of opinion over whether the data can be confidently projected to
the population as a whole.
Is there, then, some tenable intermediate position that can be ascribed to constructions of
the audience that serve as currency in the audience marketplace? Some legal scholars have
asserted the need for the courts to acknowledge a category of “‘created facts,’ . . . in which the
expressive work brings the very facts themselves into existence.” 88 John Searle offers a
potentially valuable middle ground acknowledging that “there are portions of the real world,
objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement.” 89 Such instances have
been termed “social facts.” According to Searle, a social fact arises when: a) someone declares
or states that something is the case; and b) when it becomes widely accepted something is the
case. 90 This notion of facts by human agreement seems particularly applicable to the nature of
audience constructions such as ratings, in which their functioning as a “currency” essentially
involves the unanimous acceptance, and utilization, of a particular set of social constructions as
facts. Searle even uses currency as a prime example of a social fact. 91
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Drilling deeper down into this notion of social facts, we find sub-categories that seem
particularly attributable to audience ratings. Specifically, Hughes identifies what he terms
“evaluative facts,” which involve quantitative or qualitative evaluations made by private parties
that “can become so widely accepted and so relied upon for substantial non-expressive activities
that they become social facts.” 92 Hughes’ examples of evaluative facts include a publisher’s
estimates of the resale value for used automobiles, price estimates for collectible coins, and
settlement prices established by a commodities exchange committee. 93 All of these examples
involve the setting of values for products, not unlike the way Arbitron’s assessment of the
audience size and composition of individual radio programs sets the value to advertisers of
commercial spots within these programs.
What does this mean for the issue at hand? To this point, efforts to develop some sort of
intermediate construct between fact and opinion/expression have been focused primarily on the
copyright implications of such a shift. Hughes, for instance, has advocated on behalf of the
notion of “created facts,” but has done so while also maintaining copyright protection for such
facts when judged appropriate. 94 This is relevant to this situation to the extent that it is important
to recognize that a legal path could potentially be traveled in which audience ratings are
classified as facts of a sort for the purposes of fraud assessments and commercial versus noncommercial speech determinations, but that such a classification would not necessarily deny
measurement firms such as Arbitron the copyright protection needed to sufficiently incentivize
them to produce their product.
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B. Commercial v. Non-Commercial Speech
As the previous section illustrates, the construct of audience ratings in many ways
confounds the traditional fact-opinion dichotomy that has been a key component of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Given the ambiguous state of the definition of commercial speech, it
seems unlikely that this analytical frame can provide clear-cut guidance on how to approach a
form of communication that is as uniquely ambiguous as audience ratings.
The first fundamental question that arises in making a commercial speech determination
is whether audience ratings meet the criterion of proposing a commercial transaction. An
Arbitron ratings report certainly is not an advertisement for an Arbitron product. In that regard,
the ratings are fundamentally different from any advertising or public relations communication
that Arbitron engages in on behalf of its PPM service, or from any traditional advertisement
seeking to sell a particular good or service.
Another prominent element of definitional approaches to commercial speech involves
whether the speech involves an issue of public concern that extends beyond the interests of the
buyers and sellers of the product. This is another area in which appropriately characterizing
ratings is quite tricky. To what extent do individuals outside of the radio and advertising
industries really care about the ratings performance of individual radio stations? Do enough
other people actually care enough for radio ratings – or audience ratings more broadly, for that
matter – to be considered a matter of sufficient public interest and concern to trigger their
categorization as non-commercial rather than commercial speech? Here again, it may make
sense to parse audience ratings out into some discrete subcomponents, as was done in the fact
versus opinion analysis. Specifically, a subscriber to Arbitron’s audience data receives a
tremendous volume of data. The data cover a wide range of demographic categories and are
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presented across multiple time periods, and the audience exposure expressed via a variety of
measures. 95 It is only a very basic, superficial component of all of these data, representing a
miniscule proportion of the entirety of a typical Arbitron ratings report that is reported in the
more mainstream media outlets targeting audiences outside of the radio and advertising
industries. Perhaps this dynamic should be taken into consideration in determining whether it is
appropriate to consider audience ratings as a matter of broader public interest and concern
because it suggests that whatever broader public interest exists for audience ratings extends only
to a very small component of these ratings.
This question of the broader public interest in ratings data also seems reflective of legal
analyses of commercial versus non-commercial speech that have emphasized that the distinction
should hinge on the extent to which the speech is “essential to public discourse.” 96 Robert Post,
for instance, proposes defining commercial speech as “the set of communicative acts about
commercial subjects that within a public communicative sphere convey information of relevance
to democratic decision making but that do not themselves form part of public discourse.” 97 From
this standpoint, for instance, books receive full First Amendment protection, while a form of
speech such as medicine labels does not. 98
Do audience ratings meet these somewhat stringent speech criteria of “public discourse”?
It seems difficult to place audience ratings in this category, particularly when audience ratings
reports are considered in their entirety. This perspective has been convincingly articulated
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within the context of commercial databases (a category in which audience ratings reports can be
easily included). In his analysis of the speech status of commercial databases, Weinstein
concludes that “although such speech is indeed protected, it does not enjoy nearly the same
rigorous protection as speech that is part of democratic self-governance. . . . scientific and
mathematical speech is protected primarily for instrumental reasons rather than as speech
constitutive of democracy.” 99
These obvious difficulties in easily assigning audience ratings to either the commercial or
non-commercial speech category suggest that perhaps we should dare to ask the question, are
ratings data speech at all? The New York and New Jersey Attorneys General did not put forth
such a contention, but such a possibility seems worthy of consideration. Certainly, the extent to
which so many scholars of media industries and media audiences have often critically described
the media audience as represented in ratings as a “discursive construct” 100 suggests that audience
ratings should very much be considered a form of speech. How do we reconcile the fact that
something can be simultaneously described as a discursive construct, the currency used in
economic exchange, and an opinion, yet marketed and purchased on the basis of its claimed
objectivity and accuracy? The apparent contradictions in this set of descriptors are almost headspinning. Perhaps with audience ratings we are not really talking about something that fits
within the parameters of speech established in First Amendment jurisprudence.
A number of scholars have emphasized the wide range of forms of communication that
take place in the commercial sector that have very little, if any, First Amendment protection. 101
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Frederick Schauer, for instance, notes that there is “a universe of communication relating only to
business activity, having no explicit political, artistic or ideological content, and yet differing
substantially from the kind of widespread hawking of wares” traditionally associated with
commercial speech. 102 Examples range from:
[C]ommunications to offerees, stockholders, and investors now regulated by
various state and federal securities laws, including the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; numerous communications among business
executives about prices and business practices now regulated by the Sherman
Antitrust Act; communications about working conditions and the like now
regulated by the National Labor Relations Act; representations about products and
services now regulated by the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration; representations about products now regulated by various
consumer protection laws, by the Uniform Commercial Code, and by the common
law of warranty and contract; statements about willingness to enter into a contract
now regulated by the common law of contract; and so on and on. 103
From this perspective, “Commercial speech doctrine is thus not merely about the boundary that
separates commercial speech from public discourse, but also about the boundary that separates
the category of ‘commercial speech’ from the surrounding sea of commercial communications
that do not benefit from the protections of the doctrine.” 104 The point here, is that there are
essentially some forms of communication that take place in the commercial sector that do not
even trigger the need for a First Amendment analysis.
From this perspective, Cohen questions whether “we need not to apply First Amendment
standards of review at all.” 105 This perspective of course raises the question of what exactly does
trigger a First Amendment analysis? As Post illustrates, the answer comes largely from Spence
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v. Washington, 106 in which the Court acknowledged that not all forms of conduct can be labeled
as speech, even if the individual engaging in the conduct intends to express an idea. Instead, the
Court determined that First Amendment scrutiny would only be triggered when “[a]n intent to
convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” 107
According to Post, “[t]hese criteria (known as the Spence test) have been used ever since by
lower courts to guide their decisions about whether to apply First Amendment protection.” 108
Post, however, asserts that the Spence test provides an inaccurate set of criteria regarding
when the First Amendment has been brought to bear, arguing that the determination as to
whether a First Amendment analysis is appropriate has also considered the social context.109 He
illustrates this point with the example of flight navigation charts, which, while certainly a
medium of communication for particular messages, have, when accused of being inaccurate,
been treated in the courts as products under product liability law rather than as speech receiving
First Amendment protection. This is the case because, according to Post, “First Amendment
analysis is relevant only when the values served by the First Amendment are implicated. These
values do not attach to abstract acts of communication as such, but rather to the social contexts
that envelop and give constitutional significance to acts of communication.” 110
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The question then, is does the production and dissemination of databases such as
Arbitron’s radio audience ratings necessarily meet these criteria for consideration as the type of
expressive activity that falls within the purview of the First Amendment? A number of analyses
that have focused on the appropriate analytical lens to apply to commercial databases have
concluded that the answer may be no, that the information contained within commercial
databases does not meet the criteria necessary to trigger a First Amendment analytical
framework. 111 One could certainly see how the same logic employed by Post and Schauer would
seem equally applicable to a context such as audience ratings. Essentially, audience ratings may
be closer to a navigation chart or medicine label than they are to a book or a newspaper.
Commercial databases such as audience ratings may perhaps best be considered within the
demonstrably large collection of forms of commercial communication (see above) that have long
resided largely outside of the parameters of First Amendment protection. As one analysis of the
privacy issues surrounding consumer databases noted, databases are “a tool for processing
people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the ‘marketplace of ideas.” 112 From this
perspective, Cohen questions whether “we need to apply First Amendment standards of review at
all.” 113
This line of reasoning is particularly compelling in terms of the extent it intersects with
academic analyses of audience ratings that have emphasized the extent to which it is the ratings
themselves that are the product that is produced and sold by advertising-supported media. 114
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According to Eileen Meehan, this perspective can be taken so far that “ratings per se must not be
considered as reports of human behavior, but rather as products––as commodities shaped by
business exigencies and corporate strategies.” 115
This notion of audience ratings as non-speech also seems to gain support when we
consider the unique role that audience ratings serve in the audience marketplace. As was noted
previously, ratings such as Arbitron’s serve as “currency” in the marketplace for media audience.
“Currency” audience measurement products (referred to as Currency AMPs) are treated as a
distinct category of audience measurement product from the standpoint of the Media Ratings
Council, and are defined as “Those AMPs that are widely used and form the basis for setting the
financial value of advertising.” 116
One important aspect of this idea of ratings data as currency is that the history of
audience measurement tells us that there are very powerful incentives pushing towards the use of
a single currency in any audience market. Thus, competition in the audience ratings business is
quite rare––and, most important, most participants in the audience market (i.e., purchasers of
ratings data) seem to prefer it that way. 117 The existence of multiple currencies amplifies
uncertainty about what is already a highly nebulous product; it means purchasing what can easily
be perceived as redundant information sources (imagine, for instance, a media organization
having to subscribe to two or three or four sets of audience ratings from different, competing
providers); and it introduces points of contention and inefficiency into the negotiations between
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buyers and sellers of audiences. For these reasons, advertisers and media buyers seldom have
demonstrated the necessary support for competitive ratings services for such services to take
hold and serve as meaningful competitors to the incumbent firms. In sum, most marketplaces for
ratings “currencies” are monopolies – perhaps even natural monopolies. 118
This description would suggest that the dynamics of the marketplace for audience ratings
do not at all conform to the kind of traditional “marketplace of ideas” dynamics that are
protected and promoted by the First Amendment. The audience ratings marketplace tends to
have one “speaker,” and unlike in traditional idea marketplaces, the audience tends to prefer it
that way, as it allows them to go about their work and make their relevant decisions more
efficiently. This kind of deviation from the established marketplace of ideas model raises serious
questions about the appropriateness of categorizing audience ratings as speech. And if we do,
then doing so simultaneously raises a red flag on a state of monopoly in an idea marketplace that
is utterly contradictory to the fundamental First Amendment principle that the public is best
served by the availability of “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources.” 119 There are seldom any diverse and antagonistic sources in the
marketplace for ratings data––and, more important, nobody seems to want them. The
marketplace would likely not operate efficiently if there were––leading to the inevitable
contraction back to a single currency provider. If this is how the marketplace for audience
ratings operates, then can we really be talking about a traditional, legitimate idea marketplace
warranting a First Amendment analysis?
CONCLUSION
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Clearly, the Arbitron PPM controversy raises complicated questions about the nature of
commercial speech, the nature of the media audience, and even the distinction between fact and
opinion. This article provides only a preliminary inquiry into these questions at this early,
unresolved stage in this controversy. Nonetheless, this analysis suggests that audience ratings
require looking beyond the traditional fact versus opinion dichotomy, and that the question of the
commercial/non-commercial speech categorization be expanded to address the question of
whether a First Amendment analysis is even appropriate for considering audience ratings and the
permissibility of greater legal/regulatory oversight of the audience ratings industry.
Future research not only needs to delve more deeply into the questions addressed here,
but also into related questions involving, for instance, whether the Federal Communications
Commission has the regulatory authority to engage in more active oversight of the audience
ratings industry, and whether some more authoritative form of industry self-regulation might be
appropriate/permissible. Or, should the construction of the media audience be left to the
dynamics of the market? Clearly, in this case the multi-faceted issue of race and the media has
led to the opening of a Pandora’s Box of difficult questions related to diversity, the media, and
the process of constructing the media audience.

